In recent years, the rapid expansion of the capability of portable devices, cloud servers and cellular network technologies is the wind beneath the wing of mobile social networks. Compared to traditional web-based online social networks, the mobile social networks can assist users to easily discover and make new social interaction with others. A challenging task is to protect the privacy of the users' profiles and communications. Existing works are mainly based on traditional cryptographic methods, such as homomorphic and group signatures, which are very computationally costly. In this paper, we propose a novel distributed multi-authority attributebased encryption scheme to efficiently achieve privacy-preserving without additional special signatures. In addition, the proposed scheme can achieve fine-grained and flexible access control. Detailed analysis demonstrates the effectiveness and practicability of our scheme.
In recent years, many private matching schemes have been proposed to solve this problem. Among these schemes, some protect user's privacy based on trusted third party (TTP) [5, 6, 7, 8] , the other is TTP-free [9, 10, 1] . Although, this kind of approaches can achieve profile matching without the support of TTP, they have some disadvantages. The reliance on public-key crytosytem and homomorphic encryption [11, 12, 7, 8] requires multiple rounds of interaction which causes high communication and computation overhead. Moreover, matched and unmatched users are all involved in the expensive computation and learn the matching result. Li et al. [9] propose a private matching scheme based on the common interests, which is not fine-grained. Zhang et al. [8] present a fine-grained private matching scheme but fail in considering the priority related to every attribute and they employ the homomorphic encryption which is resource consuming on mobile devices. Qi et al. [10] employ an asymmetric-scalarproduction based on kNN query, but the presentation of interests is too single to get an accurate result. Moreover, the widely used technique of group signature [13] [14] always costs huge volume of computational resources on users' hand-held devices, and the access control based on the key-policy attribute-based encryption [15] is not efficient enough. In addition, if any server or TTP is compromised, the confidentiality of the stored data may be compromised, too. Therefore, considering the powerful computationanl as well as storage ability of the TTP and cloud server, the main point of our work is to design an efficient privacy-preserving and fine-grained friend discovery system based on the combination of TTP and cloud server.
In this paper, we propose an efficient destributed multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme, which can achieve privacy preserving and fine-grained access control. By using ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [16] , the encrypted information can kept confidential even if the storage server is not fully-trusted and users can design the their own access policy. Hence, the fine-grained access control can be achieved efficiently. By employing the powerful storage and computational ability of cloud server, the storage and computaion overhead of the client can be greatly reduced. The multi-authorities are designed to be destributed, which can significantly relieves the users' trust on a single authority and is secure against collusion attack as well as chosen-plaintext attack. The main contributions are outlined as follows.
• A multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme is proposed for fine-grained multilevel access control in cloud friend discovery system. Users can design their own access policy to find the potential friends, which is user friendly.
• User's identity and personal profile are encrypted under the access policy specified by the user himself and outsourced to the cloud server, the client is lightweight.
• The destributed multi-authority model in friend discovery cloud computing system also reduces the risk of a single central authority being compromised for potential privacy leakage.
• Formal security proof and simulation evaluation demonstrate that our scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attack and collusion attack in the standard model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries are introduced in Section 2. The system architecture and models are presented in Section 3. We propose our scheme in Section 4, followed by the formal security proof and performance evaluations respectively in Section 5 and 6. Finally, we conclude our work.
System Architecture and Models

System Architecture
The architecture of the friend discovery system mainly contains the following components: the personal profile which is outsourced in the encrypted form into the cloud by the initiator; the cloud server that stores huge volumes of users' personal profiles and performs the efficient attribute matching process to realize the multi-level fine-grained access control for privacy preserving; the responders who will attend the profile matching and may be the potential friend. Moreover, in our system, there are also D central authorities (CA 1 , CA 2 ,..., CA D ) and K attribute authorities (AA 1 ,..., AA k ). Each responder has a global identifier gid ∈ GID, where the GID is the identity set of all registered users. Responders get the keys concerning their unique gid from
. Each authorized responder with attribute set AS gid will obtain their attribute secret keys from the corresponding AA k s. We assume that all the authorities are run by different organizations and governed by the government. The multiple authority setting greatly relieves the users' trust on a single CA or AA, so it is unlikely for all the authorities to collude (or to be compromised) to derive the secret keys. Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of the cloud friend discovery system. 
Security Model
The formal security model of our proposed scheme is defined by the following game runs between a challenger C and an adversary A. 
Adversary Model and Design Goal
In the profile matching process, there usually exists two main adversary models: In the honestbut-curious (HBC) model [17] , an attacker honestly follows the protocol but tries to get more information from the received message than allowed. In this paper, we suppose all the authorities and users are honest-but-curious. In malicious model [18] , an attacker tries to learn more information using background knowledge beyond his/her received message or by deliberately deviating from the protocol.
The main goal as well as the great challenge of our scheme is to conduct efficient matching against the chosen-plaintext attack and collusion attack.
Proposed Scheme
In this section, we will propose a piecewise multi-authority CP-ABE scheme. It mainly consists of the following phases: system initialization, key generation, information encryption, profile matching and decryption.
System Initialization
GlobalInit: On input 1 λ , where λ is the security parameter, this algorithm outputs the global public parameter GP RA. G is a bilinear cyclic group with the order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , where p 1 , p 2 , p 3 are distinct big prime numbers. G p i is the subgroup of G with order p i , g is the generator of G p 1 and X 3 is the generator of G p 3 . Randomly choose h∈ R G p1 . Finally, the global public parameter is published as GP RA = {N, g, h, X 3 , Σ sig }, where Σ sig = {KeyGen, Sign, V erif y} is the secure signature scheme against chosen-plaintext attack.
CASetup: On input GP RA, this algorithm outputs CA i 's public parameter CAP AR i , public key CAP K i and master key CAM SK i . First of all, each CA i runs the algorithm KeyGen in the Σ sig to generate a pair of secret key and public key < sk i , pk i >. CA i randomly chooses α i , a i ∈ R Z N to generate master secret key CAM SK i = (α i , a i , sk i ) and empty table T i , then publishes the public parameter CAP AR i = (e(g, g) αi , g ai ) and public key CAP K i = pk i . AASetup: This algorithm takes GP RA, AA k 's index k and the attribute universe U k belonging to AA k as input, and outputs master secret key AAM SK k , public parameter AAP RA k and public key
, and publishes the public parameter AAP AR k = ({T att |att ∈ U k }) and public key AAP K k = V k,i .
Key Generation
In this phase, a responder submits his/her information to request the public and secret keys. 
CA key Generation
In this step, responder registers his/her gid to CA i for requesting the responder-identity keys and finally the rppk gid,i is published. The detailed procedure is shown in Algorithm 1. 
AA key Generation
When a responder submits his/her keys to AA k for the secret key concerning some attribute att ∈ U k in his/her attribute set AS gid . The authorities first will verify the identity of the responder according to the formula:
If it fails to pass one of the verification, AA k outputs ⊗ which means that the responder is invalid and the system will end the whole procedure.
If the verification is correct, AA k will run the Algorithm 2 to generate rask gid,i . After running the algorithm, AA k transmits AS gid to the cloud server to find a matcher.
Encryption
This algorithm is performed on the initiator's hand-held device. Suppose the initiator's real identity is ID, the personal profile is m prof ile , the symmetric identity encryption key is K id , the personal profile encryption key is K prof ile , the access policy is A = (A, ρ) , the secure symmetric encryptions are E K id (·) and E K prof ile (·). The access policy is defined by a LSSS matrix (A, ρ) , where A is a l × n matrix and ρ will map each row A x in A to get an attribute ρ(x). ρ is required that when mapping different row, the attribute must not be the same. The detailed encryption procedure is shown in Algorithm 3. g) αis ,
Algorithm 3: Encryption
Input: ID, m prof ile , K id , K prof ile , GRP A, AAP AR k , CAP AR i , E K id (·), E K prof ile (·) Output: ciphertext: C A,ρ , CT id , CT prof ile 1 choose a random vector v = (s, v 2 , ..., v n ) ∈ Z n N ; 2 for x from 1 to l do 3 select a random number r x , where r x ∈ Z N ; 4 compute C x = h Ax· v T −rx ρ(x) ; 5 end 6 compute C = g * and C = g ais ; 7 for sth in {id, prof ile} do 8 compute CT K sth = K sth d i=1 e(g, g) αis 9 end 10 compute CT id = E K id (ID) and CT prof ile = E K prof ile (m prof ile ); 11 define C A,ρ = ⎛ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ CT K id = K id d i=1 e(g,CT K prof ile = K prof ile d i=1 e(g, g) αis , {C x = h Ax· v T −rx ρ(x) , C x = g rx }, C = g s , C = g ais ⎞ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ , x ∈ {1, 2, ..., l}; 12 return C A,ρ , CT id , CT prof ile DistributedMulti-authority Attribute-based Encryption Scheme ... Wang, Qi, Wu and Tang
Profile Matching and Decryption
First, the cloud server will help the responder find a matcher. If the responder's attribute set AS gid satisfies the access policy A = (A, ρ), which means there exists constants ω x ∈ Z N and ρ(x)∈AS gid ω x A x = (1, 0, ..., 0), then the cloud server transmits C A,ρ , CT id , CT prof ile to the responder. When receiving the ciphertexts, the responder runs Algorithm 4 to decrypt.
Algorithm 4: Decryption
Output: initiator's identity ID and personal profile m prof ile
e(g, g) (αu−αu,i) ;
2 for sth ∈ {id, prof ile} do
C computes the following parameters and sends them to A:
AAKeyGen to obtain attribute key, C first verifies:
If the verification is passed, C randomly chooses R att,gid ∈ G pi and computes
where 
It is noted that the above operations are with the restriction that AS gid A cannot satisfy the access policy A * . Key query phase 2. A is once again to repeat the operations in Key query phase 1. Guess. The adversary A outputs a guess b of b, and C submits b to the multi-authority CP-ABE scheme.
From the above analysis, it is obviously that the distribution of parameters, keys and ciphertexts are the same as the real scheme, there we can get Adv C = Adv A .
Performance Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the proposed scheme with several existing works in terms of efficiency and practicability. We assume that both of the initiator and the responder have mobile devices with a 2.3 GHz CPU, e.g., Nexus 5 announced in 2013. This smart phone supports both Bluetooth 4.0 and dual frequency Wi-Fi. We use Eclipse to implement the simulation code and it was written in Java. We perform the efficiency simulation and comparisons between the [19] , [20] and our proposed scheme. The size of users' attribute sets is fixed in 30 and n denotes the number of participated responders. Figure 2 (a) and Figure 2 (b) illustrate the computational cost among [19] , [20] and our scheme respectively on the initiator's and responder's ends. It is obvious that in [19] [20] the computational cost increase as the number of responders grows since it is required for the initiator to generate one group signature for each responder. Figure 2(c) shows communication overhead comparison among [19] , [20] and our proposed scheme. It is appatently that the communication cost of [19] and [20] sharply grows as the number of responders increases from 50 to 500. 
Conclusion
In this paper, a distributed multi-authority attribute-based encryption friend discovery scheme is proposed to achieve multi-level privacy and users can easily achieve fine-grained access control. The detailed security analysis demonstrates that the scheme can resist chosen-plaintext attack as well as collusion attack in the standard model and performs well in terms of storage, computational and communication cost. In our future work, we will improve the scheme by involving the functions of ciphertexts updating and revocation.
